P5+1: Interim deal and final status

Interim Deal (November 2013).

On 24th November, 2013, Iran and the six world powers (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), known as the P5+1were successful in removing the stagnation in course of negotiations over Tehran’s controversial nuclear program when the parties reached a first-phase agreement on a six-month deal that will halt Iran’s most sensitive nuclear activities and increase international monitoring of its nuclear program in exchange for some relief from sanctions that affected adversely Iran’s economy.

The deal was signed in Geneva, wherein the right to enrichment of “right to enrichment,” of Iran was recognized. This deal could serve as a basis for further negotiations. EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton led the negotiating team for the P5+1. 

The agreement makes the following stipulations on the Iranian nuclear program:

• All uranium enriched beyond 5% will either be diluted or converted to uranium oxide. No new uranium at the 3.5% enrichment level will be added to Iran's current stock.

• No new centrifuges will be installed or prepared for installation.

• 50% of the centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment facility and 75% at the Fordow enrichment facility will be left inoperable. Iran will not use its advanced IR-2 centrifuges for enrichment.

• Iran will not develop any new uranium enrichment or nuclear reprocessing facilities.

• No fuel will be produced, tested, or transferred to the Arak nuclear power plant. In addition, Iran will share design details of the reactor.

• The IAEA will be granted daily access to Natanz and Fordow, with certain sites monitored by 24-hour cameras. The IAEA will also have access to Iran's uranium mines and centrifuge production facilities.

• Iran will address IAEA questions related to possible military dimensions of the nuclear program and provide data expected as part of an Additional Protocol.

Additional Protocol. In 1993 a program was initiated to strengthen and extend the classical safeguards system under IAEA and a model protocol was agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors 1997. The measures boosted the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with no connection to the civil fuel cycle. Its key elements were: 

• The IAEA is to be given considerably more information on nuclear and nuclear-related activities, including R & D, production of uranium and thorium (regardless of whether it is traded), and nuclear-related imports and exports.

• IAEA inspectors will have greater rights of access. This will include any suspect location, it can be at short notice (e.g., two hours), and the IAEA can deploy environmental sampling and remote monitoring techniques to detect illicit activities.

• States must streamline administrative procedures so that IAEA inspectors get automatic visa renewal and can communicate more readily with IAEA headquarters.

• Further evolution of safeguards is towards evaluation of each state, taking account of its particular situation and the kind of nuclear materials it has. This will involve greater judgement on the part of IAEA and the development of effective methodologies which reassure NPT States.

Right to Enrichment.

Iran maintains that it has the right to uranium enrichment under Article IV of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which guarantees states-parties access to nuclear technology as long as they adhere to their treaty obligations. Article IV does not specifically mention uranium enrichment. U.S. policy does not interpret access to enrichment technology as a right under Article IV.

The first-phase agreement allows Iran to continue enriching uranium to a level suitable for use in a power reactor.

Current Status.

Implementation of the November 2013 agreement began 20 January 2014 as confirmed by the IAEA interim report confirmed that Iran had begun scaling back major nuclear activities, the first steps to implement the interim deal. The report followed by the partial lifting of sanctions by the United States and the EU. Senior officials of the P5+1 and Iran met February 18–20 in Vienna and agreed on a framework for future negotiations. 

Indian Stake.

After the negotiations, India is the first of Iran’s four main buyers to say it is looking to buy more oil from Iran after the agreement in Geneva. India will investigate purchasing additional oil from Iran over the coming six months covering the Geneva agreement, as well as explore the possibility of joint ventures in Iran’s oil sector. Although the agreement does not allow Iran to increase its oil sales for six months, India has room to boost its imports after they fell roughly 40 percent this year to below even what was permitted by sanctions. As a result, earlier this year Iran slipped to third position behind Saudi Arabia and Iraq as India’s supplier of oil imports. Despite this, India and China have remained the top two destinations for Iran’s oil.

Underwriting New Delhi’s rising interest in Iran’s energy sector, India is now the world’s fourth largest energy consumer after the United States, China, and Russian Federation. The U.S. government’s Energy Information Administration projects that India and China will account for the biggest share of Asian energy demand growth through 2035. Accordingly, the primary focus of India’s energy policy is securing energy sources to meet the needs of its growing economy, as India’s primary energy consumption more than doubled between 1990 and 2011.

What is not in doubt is that Iran is eager to boost its oil sales to India, which pays 45 percent of its oil payments to Iran in rupees, a valuable source of foreign revenue in light of the increasing pressure from sanctions. The sanctions have increasingly hobbled Iran’s economy. Iran, a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, ranks among the world’s top four holders of both proven oil and natural gas reserves, but since 2012, Iran saw unprecedented drops in its oil exports as U.S. and European Union sanctions were tightened, targeting Iranian oil export revenues. Preliminary data compiled by the EIA placed Iran in fifth rank in terms of crude oil and condensate exports, which was in contrast to its third position in 2011.

The sanctions have also precluded the substantial development of Iran’s natural gas reserves, the world’s second largest. As the sector is unable under sanctions to raise substantial foreign investment, the country’s natural gas reserves remain largely underdeveloped and output is used mostly to meet domestic demand, with natural gas accounting for about 59 percent of Iran’s total domestic energy consumption in 2010.

It is reported that India would buy up to an average 220,000 barrels per day of Iranian oil for the Iranian calendar year ending  March 31. India would also then be looking to increase imports in the 2014/15 financial year, depending on any further easing of the sanctions, commenting, “Iran is a great source of oil… and once the problems that have been faced by Iran are resolved then we will have more oil available in the market.” Three days later the U.S. State Department extended six-month Iran sanctions waivers to India, China, South Korea and other countries in exchange for their reducing purchases of Iranian crude oil earlier this year.

As a corollary of Indian interest in Iranian oil, New Delhi is also seeking to help Iran develop its Persian Gulf port of Chabahar for oil exports, which for India would have the added benefit of outflanking Pakistan’s Gwadar port, which they are currently developing with Chinese assistance. Chabahar would also benefit the post-Soviet Central Asian states by giving them a port outlet once railways in Iran are expanded and upgraded.

While considerable Western skepticism remains over Iran’s nuclear transparency, there is no doubt that Tehran intends to force open the sanctions door as wide as possible, and that the first foreign customer waiting on the other side is already India.

P5+1: Background

The cloud of sanctions hovering around the nuclear program of Iran may soon shatter. This has all been possible with the help of the alliance of permanent members of the UN along with Germany that soon Iran can revive its economy. The formation of this group of 6 nations known as P5+1 or EU+3 has its history in the roots of the nuclear program of Iran. 

Nuclear Program of Iran.

• 1953: Atoms for Peace Program. The former US President Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered the Atoms for Peace speech before the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953. President Eisenhower sought to curb the misuse of nuclear energy by suggesting a means to transform the atom from a scourge into a benefit for mankind. It was after this that the nuclear empowerment of Iran began.

Though, the Atoms for Peace program is criticised to be a mechanism adopted by the US to help itself in the cold war era. This led to spread of highly enriched nuclear fuel around the world. The then USSR retaliated in the similar fashion by spreading nuclear stockpiles around the world.

• 1979: Iranian Revolution and change of course.Everything changed after 1979, when events occurred that led to the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who was supported by the United States. After this event, the there was rules of an Islamic republic under the Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the revolution, who was supported by various leftist and Islamic organizations and Iranian student movements. While the Soviet Union immediately recognized the new Islamic Republic, it did not actively support the revolution, initially making efforts to salvage the Shah's government. The regime was overthrown because of its corrupt practices and several policies that tended it to be puppet of the West.

After the 1979 revolution, a clandestine nuclear weapons research program was disbanded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–1989), who considered such weapons forbidden under Muslim ethics and jurisprudence. Iran has signed treaties repudiating the possession of weapons of mass destruction including the Biological Weapons Convention,the Chemical Weapons Convention,and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Following the 1979 Revolution, most of the international nuclear cooperation with Iran was cut off. While some companies said they based their action on Iran's non-payment of $450 million in overdue payments, while other sources claim the construction was halted under pressure from the United States. The United States itself cut off the supply of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel for the Tehran Nuclear Research Center, which forced the reactor to shut down for a number of years, until Argentina's National Atomic Energy Commission in 1987–88 signed an agreement with Iran to help in converting the reactor from highly enriched uranium fuel to 19.75% low-enriched uranium, and to supply the low-enriched uranium to Iran.  

• In 1981, Iranian governmental officials concluded that the country's nuclear development should continue. Reports to the IAEA included that a site at Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTEC) would act "as the center for the transfer and development of nuclear technology, as well as contribute to the formation of local expertise and manpower needed to sustain a very ambitious program in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel cycle technology."
• In 1983, IAEA officials were keen to assist Iran in chemical aspects of reactor fuel fabrication, chemical engineering and design aspects of pilot plants for uranium conversion, corrosion of nuclear materials, LWR fuel fabrication, and pilot plant development for production of nuclear fuel. However, the U.S. government "directly intervened" to discourage IAEA assistance in Iranian production of these materials. Iran later set up a bilateral cooperation on fuel cycle related issues with China, owing to the US pressure, China stepped back.
• In April 1984, West German intelligence reported that Iran might have a nuclear bomb within two years with uranium from Pakistan.

• During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), the two Bushehr reactors were damaged by multiple Iraqi air strikes and work on the nuclear program came to a standstill. Iran notified the International Atomic Energy Agency of the blasts, and complained about international inaction and the use of French made missiles in the attack. 

• In the late 1980s, Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani metallurgist and the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, sells Iran, North Korea and Libya his uranium enrichment technology, and in Libya's case, a bomb design. The transactions do not become public until years later.

• 1995: Iran and Russia Sign Nuclear Contract. Iran announces that it will sign an $800 million contract with Russia to complete construction on one of two light water reactors at the Bushehr nuclear plant within four years. After many delays, the project was completed in 2010.

• 1996: Sanctions Against Iran and Libya. With growing intelligence estimates that Iran may secretly be trying to build a nuclear weapon, President Bill Clinton signs a bill imposing sanctions on foreign companies with investments in Iran and Libya. Such rules are already in place for American companies.

• 1999: Proposal for Nuclear-Free Mideast. President Mohammad Khatami of Iran goes to Saudi Arabia, becoming the first Iranian leader since 1979 to visit the Arab world. He issues a joint statement with King Fahd expressing concerns about Israel's nuclear weapons program and support for ridding the Middle East of nuclear weapons. In 2003, Iran supports such a proposal initiated by Syria.

• 2002: Discovery of Secret Plants. Mujahedeen Khalq, an Iranian dissident group also known as the M.E.K., obtains and shares documents revealing a clandestine nuclear program previously unknown to the United Nations.
  
• The program includes a vast uranium enrichment plant at Natanz and a heavy water plant at Arak. In December, satellite photographs of Natanz and Arak appear widely in the news media. The United States accuses Tehran of an "across-the-board pursuit of weapons of mass destruction," but takes relatively little action because it is focused on the approaching invasion of Iraq the next year.

• Iran agrees to inspections by the I.A.E.A. It also signs an accord with Russia to speed up completion of the nuclear power plant at Bushehr.

• 2003: Nuclear Program Is Suspended. Possibly in response to the American invasion of Iraq, which was originally justified by the Bush administration on the grounds that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, Ayatollah Khamenei orders a suspension of work on what appear to be weapons-related technologies, although he allows uranium enrichment efforts to continue.

• 2005: Ahmadinejad Elected President. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, known only as a secular conservative and a former mayor of Tehran, becomes president.
• 2006: Natanz Production is Restarted. Iran resumes uranium enrichment at Natanz after negotiations with European and American officials collapse. The I.A.E.A. approves a resolution to report Iran's nuclear program to the Security Council, citing “the absence of confidence" among the atomic agency's members "that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.”

Sanctions.

The next thing in the entire timeline is continued with the trail of sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. These are:

• The first resolution (1696) was adopted in July 2006 which demanded that Iran halt its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.

• Resolutions, (1737) in December 2006, (1747) in March of 2007, and (1803) in March 2008, which have imposed gradual sanctions on Iranian individuals and entities believed to be involved in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.

• UN Security Council Resolution (1835), adopted in September 2008, restated the Security Council’s demands made in resolution (1696) of 2006 but without imposing additional sanctions.

• The last Security Council resolution (1929), adopted in June 2010, saw the expansion of more sanctions on Iran for its lack of cooperation and its continued uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. The sanctions curtail military purchases, trade and financial transactions carried out by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which controls the nuclear program.

Apart from the UN, the US and the West did not lag behind adding fuel to the fire.

• 2011: Sanctions by the West and the US. Major Western powers take significant steps to cut Iran off from the international financial system, announcing coordinated sanctions aimed at its central bank and commercial banks. The United States also imposes sanctions on companies involved in Iran’s nuclear industry, as well as on its petrochemical and oil industries.

• 2012: Embargo on Iranian Oil. A European Union embargo on Iranian oil takes effect, playing a large role in severely restricting Iran's ability to sell its most important export. In retaliation, Iran announces legislation intended to disrupt traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, a vital Persian Gulf shipping lane, and tests missiles in a desert drill clearly intended as a warning to Israel and the United States.

• Iran's Currency Tumbles. After months of harsh, American-led sanctions, Iran's currency, the rial, plunges 40 percent. The currency lost about half its value in 2012.

• 2013: A new round of American sanctions take effect which state that any country that buys Iranian oil must put the purchase money into a local bank account. Iran cannot repatriate the money and can use it only to buy goods within that country.
• The United States blacklisted four Iranian companies and one individual suspected of helping the Iran enrich nuclear fuel. It also singles out two other companies, including a Venezuelan-Iranian bank, accused of helping Iran evade other Western-imposed prohibitions on oil sales and financial dealings.

Change in regime and change in course.

• June 2013: Iran Elects New President. Voters overwhelmingly elect Hassan Rouhani, 64, a mild-mannered cleric who advocates greater personal freedoms and a more conciliatory approach to the world. He played a key role in Iran’s voluntary suspension of uranium enrichment in 2004.

Regimes controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and Indian position.

It was a situation equivalent to adding fuel to the fire when India -who denied to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 - conducted its nuclear test in 1974 at Pokhran.

Jawaharlal Nehru,before he became the nation's first Prime Minister, announced:

"As long as the world is constituted as it is, every country will have to devise and use the latest devices for its protection. I have no doubt India will develop her scientific researches and I hope Indian scientists will use the atomic force for constructive purposes. But if India is threatened, she will inevitably try to defend herself by all means at her disposal."

Nuclear program of India.

• 1944. India's started its nuclear program started and its three-stage programme in nuclear technology was founded by Dr. Homi Bhabha, when he founded the nuclear research center, the Institute of Fundamental Research. India's loss of territory to China in a brief Himilayan border war in October 1962, provided the New Delhi government impetus for developing nuclear weapons as a means of deterring potential Chinese aggression.
• 1972. India ratified the Biological Weapon Convention (BWC).
• 1974. India conducetd its first nuclear test (code-named "Smiling Buddha"), which it called a "peaceful nuclear explosion." It used plutonium produced in the Canadian-supplied CIRUS reactor. As a consequence, it raised concerns that nuclear technology supplied for peaceful purposes could be diverted to weapons purposes. 
• 1975. As a result of the test of 1975, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed.Its purpose was to curb the proliferation of certain non-weapons specific nuclear technology that could be readily turned to weapons development. Nations already signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) saw the need to further limit the export of nuclear equipment, materials or technology.
• 1996. India ratified the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC).
• 1998. India performed further nuclear tests (code-named "Operation Shakti"). In 1998, as a response to the continuing tests, the United States and Japan imposed sanctions on India, which have since been lifted.
• 2010. The National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon confirmed a significant shift in nuclear weapon use policy from "No first use" to "no first use against non-nuclear weapon states".

Major regimes on use of nuclear technology and Indian position.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 1968. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT, is an international treaty, which was brought with objective to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. It was opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970.
India is one of the four UN member states that have never joined the NPT (others being Israel, Pakistan and South Sudan). The reason being the failure of the NPT to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons or the motivation to acquire them. While Article VI of the treaty obligates the nuclear weapons states to liquidate their nuclear stockpiles and pursue complete disarmament, the non-nuclear states see no signs of this happening as the five authorized nuclear weapons states (all five permanent members of the Security Council) still have 22,000 warheads between them and have shown a reluctance to disarm further.

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). 1975. Unlike the NPT (which focuses on the curb on proliferation of the nuclear weapons), the NSG is a multinational body concerned with reducing nuclear proliferation by controlling the export and re-transfer of materials that may be applicable to nuclear weapon development and by improving safeguards and protection on existing materials.

As the Pokhran test of 1974 showed that certain non-weapons specific nuclear technology that could be readily turned to weapons development, the formation of NSG was considered inevitable.The provisions of this group prohibit the members from engaging in trade of nuclear materials and technologies with the countries that have not signed NPT.

India is not a member of the NSG but in a meeting of 2008, the NSG participating governments agreed to grant India a "clean waiver" from its existing rules, which forbid nuclear trade with a country which has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This was to facilitate the implementation of the civil nuclear deal between India and USA in 2008.

Also, during a state visit to India in November 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama announced U.S. support for India's participation in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime, "in a phased manner,".

During a visit to India in December 2010, French President Sarkozy also expressed his country's backing for India's inclusion in Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The United Kingdom has for a long time been a supporter of India's inclusion in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Australia Group. 1985. Keeping into mind the disaster caused by the use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war (1984), the Australian government proposed creating the group in April 1985 as a means of uniting 15 countries that had independently established national controls on chemical weapons-related exports. At the first meeting in June 1985, the Australia Group initially focused on chemical weapons but by 1990 had extended its activities to include biological weapons. 

India has ratified the Biological Weapon Convention (BWC), 1972 and Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), 1992. India has a well-developed biotechnology infrastructure and highly qualified scientists for working with lethal pathogens. Some of India's facilities are being used to support research and development of Biological Weapon for defence purposes and not for attacking purposes.

Also, after signing CWC, it destroyed its stockpile of chemical weapons completely by 2009.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 1987.The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal and voluntary partnership between 34 countries to prevent the proliferation of missile and unmanned aerial vehicle technology capable of carrying a 500 kg payload at least 300 km. It was created with the objective to curb the spread of unmanned delivery systems for nuclear weapons, specifically delivery systems that could carry a minimum payload of 500 kg a minimum of 300 km.

The MTCR rests on adherence to common export policy guidelines (the MTCR Guidelines) applied to an integral common list of controlled items (the MTCR Equipment, Software and Technology Annex).Each MTCR member is supposed to establish national export control policies for ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, space launch vehicles, drones, remotely piloted vehicles, sounding rockets, and underlying components and technologies that appear on the regime's Material and Technology Annex. Members can add items to or subtract them from the annex through consensus decisions.

Of all the control regimes, this regime has prevented India from acquiring the technologies for missile purposes and satellite launching purposes. Historically, the US imposed sanction on the USSR in 1990, as even after agreeing to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines, Russia sought to transfer cryogenic rocket engines to India which resulted in imposition of sanctions on both the countries by the US. Although the Russians cancelled the sale of technology and consequently the sanctions on them were lifted, the sanctions against India remained in place until their expiry in May 1994.

In 2008 India voluntarily committed to following the MTCR export control guidelines.

The Wassenaar Arrangement. 1996.It is the successor to the Cold War-era Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), and was established on 12 July 1996, in Wassenaar, the Netherlands, which is near The Hague. The Wassenaar Arrangement is considerably less strict than COCOM, focusing primarily on the transparency of national export control regimes.

Every six months member countries exchange information on deliveries of conventional arms and dual-use goods to non-Wassenaar members that fall under eight broad weapons categories: battle tanks, Armored combat vehicles (ACVs), large-caliber artillery, military aircraft, military helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, and small arms and light weapons.